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 1. INTRODUCTION 
For most countries in southern Africa, food security has traditionally been addressed through 
self-sufficiency, normally attained through widespread government involvement in the input and 
output markets for major food commodities.  Food policies through the 1980’s have been 
characterized by input subsidies for farmers, fixed, pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing 
systems in commodity markets, mainly implemented through parastatal marketing boards, as 
well as subsidies and price controls at the wholesale and retail levels.  Most of these policies 
have since been abandoned for more market oriented policies, either under the Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs), or domestic reforms, of the 1990’s.  During the same period, most 
countries in the region joined the multilateral trading system, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), just in time for the Uruguay Round tariff reforms, and on a regional level, two regional 
free trade agreements were ratified, under the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), and bilateral 
preferential trading agreements continue to be negotiated.  These policy shifts have left in their 
wake a region characterized by a blend of food policy, with greater openness and a market-led 
economy in some countries, while substantial government involvement persists in others.  In this 
policy environment, food supply volatility, price instability and weak coordination of trade 
policy remain fundamental problems. 
Improving intra-regional trade, through reduction of tariff and non-tariff measures has 
been widely advocated for as a critical piece in the food insecurity puzzle (SADC FANR 2003, 
World Bank DTIS, Mozambique 2004, Malawi 2002, Tschirley et al 2004, Mano 2003, Arlindo 
and Tschirley 2003, Moepeng 2003), and significant amount of work has already gone into 
monitoring cross-border trade movement of food grains in the region (WFP/FEWS 2004-2006, 
  1USAID 1995).  However, it has also been shown that the extent to which benefits expected from 
greater market openness are realized depends significantly on how well integrated and efficient 
the markets are, both within and across borders (Ndlela 2002, Lewis 2002, Wobst 2002, Arndt 
2005, World Bank 2002 and 2004).  Integrated and / or efficient markets provide a mechanism 
for price signals to be transmitted between markets, curb price volatility, and ensure that prices 
deliver accurate incentives.  
In the southern Africa region, research efforts have focused on analyzing integration of 
agricultural markets at an intra-country level (Abdula 2005, Tostão and Brorsen 2005, Alemu 
and Baucuana 2006, Penzhorn and Arndt 2002, Traub et al 2004, Mabaya 2003, Mutambatsere 
2002, Barrett 1997).  Limited work has gone into evaluating how well integrated or efficient the 
markets are at the regional level, to ascertain if in fact trade is a viable food security strategy 
given existing market systems.  This paper analyzes bilateral integration and efficiency for 
distinct maize markets in a sample of four countries: Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and South 
Africa, vis-à-vis current trade flows and existing marketing systems.  The specific objectives are 
to: (1) evaluate the nature of price co-movements and trade relations among the sample markets, 
(2) establish the level of regional spatial integration, and (3) evaluate the level of market 
efficiency.  Data on maize prices, trade volumes and transfer costs are analyzed using the 
Barrett-Li Model (BLM), supported by a comprehensive non-parametric description of market 
pairs.  
 
2. MODEL  TERMINOLOGY 
Market integration traditionally has been used as a proxy for measuring market efficiency, 
initially employing time series price-based methods such as bivariate correlations, causality tests 
  2and co-integration analyses (also known as level I procedures, Barrett 1996).  As the limitations 
of those methods became apparent, more sophisticated models emerged that incorporated 
transfer costs data, and later trade volumes, in analyzing market efficiency (called level II and 
level III methods respectively).  With those developments, a crucial need to clearly define 
specific market outcomes arose.  
In a survey of spatial price analyses, Fackler and Goodwin 2001 distinguish among 
several market linkage concepts for markets interlinked in space, form or time.  The authors 
show that the ‘integration’ concept, have been ‘loosely applied, such that the same word may 
involve distinctly different concepts in different studies’ (Fackler and Goodwin 2001).  Barrett 
2001 proposes a clear distinction between the concepts of integration and efficiency, where 
integration is restricted to the flow-based notion of tradability, whereas efficiency is taken as a 
price-based concept that relates to the satisfaction of equilibrium conditions.  Here, market 
efficiency holds under one of three conditions:  
  ji j i P P τ + ≤  if     (1)  0 = ji q
ji j i P P τ + =  if  ( ) ji ji q q , 0 ∈    (2) 
ji j i P P τ + ≥  if  ji ji q q =    (3) 
where   and  are the prices in markets i and j,  i P j P ji τ  is the cost of transferring the good from 
market j to market i,  is the quantity traded and  ji q ji q is the maximal possible trade volume 
(Barrett 2001, Takayama and Judge 1964, Samuelson 1952, Enke 1951).  We adopt those 
definitions of integration and efficiency in this paper
1.   
                                                 
1 Note that from the defined equilibrium conditions, trade (hence integration) is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
market efficiency. 
  33.  MODEL AND DATA  
The Barrett-Li model (Barrett and Li 2002) is used to establish direction specific integration and 
equilibrium for the four market pairs considered in this analysis: Gaborone-Gauteng, Gauteng-
Maputo, Maputo-Mocuba and Mocuba-Blantyre.  A level III method, the BLM is an extension of 
parity bounds (Baulch 1997) and switching regimes (Spiller and Haung 1986, Sexton, Kling and 
Carman 1991) procedures, employing time series price, exogenous transfer costs and trade flow 
data in evaluating market integration and efficiency.  The BLM’s main improvements from level 
II parity bounds and switching regime models are that first, the BLM provides a clear, testable 
distinction between market integration and competitive market equilibrium; and second, it makes 
use of direction specific trade data (with no restrictions on continuity or direction of trade flows 
between markets), useful in providing a holistic characterization of bilateral market behaviors.  
The BLM also can be employed to assess market integration and efficiency for commodities that 
are not entirely homogenous, since it takes into consideration seasonal or contemporaneous 
bidirectional trade. 
To recap, market integration implies the transfer of excess demand from one market to 
another, manifest in the physical flow of commodities (tradability) and/or the transmission of 
price shocks from one market to another (contestability), whereas competitive equilibrium refers 
to the state in which the marginal profits from trade are completely arbitraged.  Let Pit be the 
price in market i at time t, Cjit the observable costs of transferring commodities from market j to i 
at time t, RR
: 
jit = Pit - Pjt - Cjit the marginal returns from arbitrage between markets j and i at time 
t, and Tjit the volume of trade from market j to i at time t.  Six market regimes are identified
 Regime  1:  RRjit = 0  and Tjit > 0 , perfect integration with trade     (4) 
 Regime  2:  RRjit = 0  and Tjit = 0 , perfect integration without trade   (5) 
  4 Regime  3:  RRjit > 0  and Tjit > 0 , inefficient integration       (6) 
 Regime  4:    RRjit > 0  and Tjit = 0 , segmented disequilibrium     (7) 
 Regime  5:  RRjit < 0  and Tjit > 0 , inefficient integration       (8) 
 Regime  6:  RRjit < 0  and Tjit = 0, segmented equilibrium      (9) 
Competitive equilibrium prevails whenever the inter-market arbitrage condition holds with 
equality, or when transfer costs exceed price differentials so that no trade occurs: 
 R jit = 0;   or RRjit < 0 and Tjit = 0     (10) 
Market integration holds whenever the inter-market arbitrage condition is binding or when 
positive trade is observed:  
 R jit = 0;  or Tjit  >  0     (11) 
A joint probability distribution can be estimated for Tjit and RRjit.  Let λk be the estimated 
probability associated with regime k.  Market equilibrium prevails with estimated probability λ1 
+ λ2 + λ6, and integration with estimated probability λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ5.  The maximum likelihood 
method is used to establish the probability of being in each regime.  Following Baulch’s logic for 
parity bounds models, we use available point estimates of transfer costs to establish a confidence 
interval (the lower and upper parity bounds) within which the deflated transfer costs are allowed 
to vary.  This translates into an interval for Rjit
R .  The deviation of returns to arbitrage in each time 
period from the null hypothesis of perfect integration (or zero returns to arbitrage) is captured by 
a systematic error term vt, assumed to be normally distributed with mean α and variance 
2
v σ , 
plus a positive error term ut that is added when RRjit > 0 and subtracted when Rjit
R  < 0.  ut is 
assumed to follow a half normal distribution with variance
2
u σ .  A non-zero term α captures the 
random components of measurement error or the unobservable component of transfer costs 
  5(Barrett and Li 2001).  Following Weinstein 1964, on summing a normally and half-normally 





































































































































The maximum likelihood function for this parity bounds model is given by: 
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1 1 λ λ λ λ λ λ     (15) 
where the parameters λ1 to λ6, α, σv and σu are estimated by optimizing In(L) with respect to 
each parameter.  In this specification, Tjit is a dummy variable taking values 0 when trade occurs 
and 1 when trade does not occur, Ф[.] is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 
and φ[.] the standard probability density function.  
which transactions costs are measured also influences credibility of results.  Second, this model 
                                                
A few limitations of the BLM are worth mentioning.  First, this procedure is fairly data 
intensive, and transfer costs and trade data of the required frequency are not always readily 
available.  Transfer costs for example are extremely difficult to measure, comprising numerous 
components
2 including unobservable aspects such as risk and suck costs.  Thus the accuracy with 
 
2 Barrett identifies the following components: transport costs, costs associated with insurance, financing, hedging, 
contracting and satisfying technical barriers to trade such as complying with safety standards, exogenous transfer 
costs such as underwriting fees and testing charges, duties, and a whole host of unmeasurable transactions costs 
associated with doing business (opportunity costs of entrepreneurial time, search costs, risk, price and exchange rate 
variability etc) (Barrett 2001). 
  6offers only static comparisons, and does not permit dynamic analysis of inter-temporal 
adjustments to deviations from long-run equilibrium (Barrett 2001).  The model also suffers 
some of the limitations generally associated with switching regimes models: it assumes serial 
independence of price and transfer costs data, and regime probability estimates are sensitive to 
the underlying regime probability distribution assumptions (Barrett and Li 2001, Fackler and 
Goodwin 2001).  
 
A sample of five markets in southern Africa is analyzed: Gaborone in Botswana, Gauteng in 
                                                
South Africa, Blantyre in Malawi, and Maputo and Mocuba in Mozambique (see figure 1).   
Maputo, a net maize buyer, is included as the central market for Mozambique’s southern region, 
and Mocuba (a net seller) as the representative market for the northern region
3.  Generally, the 
choice of markets was based on centrality of each market in the countries under study, each 
representing one of the largest consumer and/or producer markets in each country.  Market 
choice was also based on data availability, and on diversity of trade relations among the sample 
markets.  For example, whereas the Botswana and South Africa markets are engaged in 
continuous trade with no tariffs, South Africa and southern Mozambique (Malawi and northern 
Mozambique) are characterized by mostly unidirectional continuous, protected trade; South 
Africa and Malawi by bidirectional discontinuous trade; and Botswana and Malawi/Mozambique 
by very little trade.  Two markets are included for Mozambique to capture distinct trade relations 
between Mozambique and neighboring South Africa and Malawi.   This set of markets thus 
 
3 The Northern region here comprises the four regions: Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Zambezia, and the 
Southern region is made up of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane.  
  7makes up an interesting sample, in which some typical assumptions about market connectedness 
and efficiency can be tested.  
Monthly time series data on maize retail prices from each of these markets Pjt, direction-
specific transfer costs between market pairs Cjit, and direction-specific trade volumes Tjit, are 
used in this analysis.  The complete set comprised data for the time period June 1994 to 
December 2004.  Sources of these data are summarized in Table 1.   
Table 1: Data and Sources  
SOURCE   
Price   Trade flows  Hauling 
costs 
Tariff Rates  Exchange Rates, 
Consumer Indices   
Fuel Prices  















WITS, DTI  STATS SA, 
Reserve Bank 
DME  






WITS   INE   MoE 
Abbreviations: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Bank of Botswana (BoB), World Bank (WB), Botswana Agricultural 
Marketing Board (BAMB), Food Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET), Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) 
online database FAOSTAT, World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) – World Bank trade database, Trade and Industry Policy 
Strategies (TIPS), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), National Department of Agriculture (NDA), South African Grain 
Information Services (SAGIS),  South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX), National Department of Minerals and Energy 
(NDME), National Institute of Statistics (INE), Agricultural Marketing System under the Ministry of Agriculture (SIMA), 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI), Ministry of Energy (MoE).  
*Studies are outlined in-text. 
 
All of the price statistics were reported in local currency, and were converted to their US$ 
equivalents using the appropriate exchange rate.  These values were used as the ‘normalized’ 
price series without further inflation adjustments.  Overall, the maize price series (US Dollar 
equivalents) for the sample markets are volatile, non-stationary processes, integrated of order 1. 
Higher price volatility is observed for Mocuba, Maputo and Blantyre, with Gauteng and 
Gaborone prices appearing to be the least volatile.  Table 2 shows selected descriptive statistics 
for the market price data. 
 
 
  8Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Maize Prices, US$/ton  
  Gauteng   Gaborone   Maputo  Mocuba   Blantyre 
Mean  139.7368 177.6928 228.7836 124.7917  201.7333 
Standard  Error  1.776191 3.057913 6.505519 5.457079  6.160831 
Median 143.5  183  218  111  184.5 
Mode  149 181 225 111  112 
Standard  Deviation  24.48311 39.39846 75.30683 65.48494  82.65622 
Mean Confidence Level (95%)  3.503706  6.037683  12.86766  10.78696  7.685807 
 
Occasionally in the analyses, reference is made to the ‘trade unit values’ of maize, computed as 
the source/destination specific per unit value of the maize traded.  As shown later, trade unit 
values sometimes differ from the market prices prevailing in either the source or destination 
markets, and may help explain perceived discrepancies in trade flows given the market price 
determined returns to arbitrage.  Because trade unit values are national averages rather than 
market specific values, their use is restricted mainly to the discussion of results.   
The transfer costs variable was challenging to construct, given incomplete and 
asymmetric data availability for the sample markets.  The series was derived primarily from the 
per km hauling costs for road and rail transportation estimated in the World Bank’s diagnostic 
trade integration studies for Malawi and Mozambique (2001), Tostão and Brorsen 2005, SADC 
freight studies by Vink et al 2002, Kandiero et at 2005, Erero and van Heerman 2005, the Food 
Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network (FANRPAN) 2003, and from 
SAGIS 2005.  These sources provide several point estimates for the study period that, following 
Baulch 1997, are extrapolated to cover the study period.  Data of varying degrees of 
completeness on fuel prices, distance between markets and transport cost indices are employed in 
the extrapolation process.  Often, when such extrapolations are performed, conservative and 
extreme point estimates of the transfer costs variable are offered in the literature.  In this analysis 
we adopt the average of extreme estimates where appropriate, allowing for the variability 
observed in the transport cost index and fuel costs to determine seasonal fluctuations of transfer 
  9costs.  Data on tariff rates were used to estimate the tariff costs per unit traded between specific 
markets, and these were added to the hauling costs estimates.   
In Mozambique the Value Added Tax (VAT) on imported maize grain is observed to be 
quite high, and is often considered trade restrictive (Tschirley et al 2005).  In this analysis, since 
VAT is an internal tax that is often subject to exemption, we refer to it only in explaining 
observed trade flows, rather than as part of transfer costs.  Costs such as handling, border 
inefficiency, and insurance costs could not be captured in the transfer costs estimates used here, 
however considering that maize is a non-perishable, low-value commodity, we might expect 
border losses due to spoilage, and insurance costs, to be relatively small.  Note that transfer costs 
between any given market pair are not symmetric, since the fuel prices and consumer indices are 
market specific, and tariff rates differ between countries for specific time periods. 
Trade statistics, though generally available from various sources for the study period, are 
almost exclusively available in annual form.  For the sample countries, more frequent trade 
statistics are limited to some historic quarterly statistics for Botswana, a few recent monthly 
statistics for South Africa available from the Department of Trade and Industry, and for Malawi 
and Mozambique, monthly trade statistics for specific trade routes available from Food Early 
Warning System Network (FEWS NET)’s cross border trade monitoring studies.  The major 
challenge in consolidating the trade flow variable was that the most comprehensive bilateral 
trade time series, available from WITS, is reported on an annual basis, whereas the monthly 
statistics such as those from FEWS NET were only available for recent years, often falling 
outside of the study period.  Moreover, with the exception of FEWS NET data, trade statistics 
only tell country level bilateral flows, but do not identify exactly what markets the commodity 
originated from, or where it was destined.  In this analysis, the trade dummy variable used in the 
  10Barrett-Li analysis was derived from the annual statistics, using the monthly data where they 
exist to predict the months in which trade is likely to have occurred.  To handle the issues of 
source and destination of reported trade, trade literature for the region
4 were referred to.   
Because of these numerous assumptions and adjustments made to derive frequent, reasonably 
accurate trade statistics could only be derived for four market pairs: Gaborone – Gauteng, 
Gauteng – Maputo, Maputo – Mocuba, and Mocuba – Blantyre.  The parity bounds analysis was 
applied to these market pairs, and the results are presented in section 4.  
                                                
 
4.   RESULTS 
Description of Markets  
This section offers a non-parametric description of the markets to help explain some of the trends 
observed in the econometric assessments that follow, and to assess the goodness of fit for the 
variable distributions and other statistical restrictions on the data imposed by the maximum 
likelihood estimations.  The main characteristics of each market are summarized in Tables 3 and 
4, and a description of the returns to arbitrage between markets is provided.  Figure 1 shows the 
location of the markets in the sample (Gauteng is the region of South Africa in which the cities 
Johannesburg and Pretoria are located), some of the major ports, the transportation networks 
linking them together and the estimated distances between the markets included in the sample.  
For clarity of presentation, the figure does not show most of the road networks, only those that 
link major ports for which rail does not exist are shown.  Figure 2 shows the cumulative 
distribution of returns to arbitrage between distinct markets given price and transfer costs 
movements.   
 
4 Such as FANRPAN publications, SADC publications, MSU Food Security studies, and TIPS publications. 










DISTANCE BETWEEN MARKETS:                              
Gauteng to Gaborone – 358km                                                     
Gauteng to Maputo – 602km   
Maputo to Mocuba – 1320 km 
Blantyre to Mocuba – 310 km  
                                                    
 Major  market 
 Rail/Road 
 
An assessment of the sources of imports and destinations of exports for the SADC region 
indicates that although intra-regional trade generally contributes a small proportion of total trade 
volumes, the trend is significantly different for trade of maize.  Statistics indicate that formal 
trade among SADC countries accounts for over 95% of total maize exports and about 80% of 
maize imports, in addition to an estimated 270,000tons (about 8.5% of total trade quantity) 
traded informally between neighboring states (WITS 2005, FEWS NET 2005, USAID 1995).  
 
 
  12Table 3: Trade Frequencies, Annual Between Countries: 1994 to 2005 
                         To 
From   South Africa  Botswana   Mozambique  
 
Malawi 
South Africa   -  100%  100%  89% 
Botswana   100%  -  0%  0% 
Mozambique 56%  0%  -  78% 
Malawi 47%  0%  44%  - 
Source: WITS 2005  
 
Table 4: Description of Sample Markets  
  BOTSWANA   MOZAMBIQUE   SOUTH AFRICA  MALAWI 
Cereal 
production  
10% of aggregate 
needs  
1.25 million tons per 
year 




80,000 tons per 
year  
1.35 million tons per 
year 
7.5 million tons per year  1.5million tons per 
year  
Imports   71,000 tons per 
year  
200,000 tons a year  550,000 tons per year  125,000 tons 
(about 8.5% of 
aggregate needs) 
per year  





South Africa (95% 
of imports, 75% of 
exports), Namibia 
(14% of exports), 
Zimbabwe (5% of 
imports) 
 
South Africa (80% of 
imports), Swaziland 
(3.6% of imports), 
Malawi (close to 60% 
of total exports). 
Limited trade with 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
Angola and DRC 
Zimbabwe (40% of total 
exports, 1.5% of total 
imports, 75% of regional 
imports)
5, Botswana (5-
7% of total exports), 
Malawi and Mozambique 
(10% of exports, ≈0.1% 
of imports)  
Mozambique (60% 
of imports), South 
Africa (25% of 
total imports, 3.5% 
of total exports), 
Zimbabwe (24% of 
exports), Tanzania 
(14% of exports), 
Zambia (3% of 
total imports, 0.1% 
of total exports) 
Tariffs and 
taxes on maize  
0% for SACU 
imports  
6.7c/kg on grain, 
10c/kg on maize 
flour  
0% on maize grain, 
25% on maize flour, 
17% VAT on 
imported grain 
0% for SACU imports 
6.7c/kg on grain, 10c/kg 
on maize flour 
0% for COMESA 
imports  
0% on grain, 15% 
on maize flour 
 GABORONE    MAPUTO  GAUTENG  BLANTYRE 
Geographic 
Status  
Capital City  Capital Province  Capital Province  Commercial 
Capital 
Population   270,000 (15% of 
total) 
> 1 million (7.5% of 
total) 
3.2 million, 17% of total  502, 000 (1/3 of 
urban population, 
4% of total)  
Maize 
production  
-  2% of aggregate    5% of aggregate   15.8% of aggregate 
Sources: WITS, FAOSTAT, National statistics offices 
                                                 
5 Most of South Africa’s imports are from the international market, and in aggregate, South Africa’s imports from 
Zimbabwe are only 1.75% of total imports. 
  13 Figure 2: Returns to Arbitrage - Market Price Estimates 












-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60




































-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80



































-50 0 50 100 150 200




































-250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0



































-150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150



































-350 -300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0



































-50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350



































-400 -350 -300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50

























Price and transfer costs statistics indicate that the prices in Gaborone exceed Gauteng prices for 
most of the study period, and that the returns to arbitrage of grain from Gauteng to Gaborone are 
positive about 90% of the time.  Conversely for the Gaborone to Gauteng trade direction, returns 
to arbitrage are almost always negative.  For the Gauteng-Maputo market pair we observe again 
  14a one-sided trend in positive returns to arbitrage, with Maputo prices consistently exceeding the 
market prices for Gauteng.  Market prices in Blantyre are also observed to exceed the Mocuba 
prices for most of the study period, and returns to trade on the Mocuba to Blantyre trade route 
are non-negative for nearly 90% of the time.  We also observe that although market prices in 
Maputo consistently exceed Mocuba prices, the fairly high transfer costs on the Mocuba to 
Maputo trade route erode a significant proportion of the arbitrage profits.  A more detailed pair-
wise description of the markets is presented under the BLM results section, and shows trends that 
are largely consistent with the observed trade frequencies presented in Table 3, and the 
cumulative arbitrage returns distributions presented in Figure 2; with more distinctly defined 
regime frequencies.  
 
The Barrett-Li Model Results  
The log of the maximum likelihood function defined in equation (15) is used to estimate the 
parameters λ1 to λ6 as defined above for the BLM, and α, σv and σu. The optimization program 
Solver, which utilizes the generalized reduced gradient (GRG) algorithm, implemented in an 
enhanced version of the GRG2 code (Lasden and Waren 1979), is used in solving the 
maximization problem.  The resultant parameter estimates are presented in Table 5.   
Table 5: Summary of Barrett-Li Model Results 
Direction of Trade  Regime Probability 
  λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5 λ6 σu σv α 
Gauteng to Gaborone  0.2501 0.000  0.6292  0.000 0.1194  0.000 42.539  0.0000  -6.3584 
Gaborone to Gauteng  0.000  0.0158  0.0390 0.0645  0.1161 0.7636 38.635  1.95042  -19.3133 
Gauteng to Maputo   0.0097  0.000  0.8932 0.000  0.0971 0.000 74.997 0.001  1.09869 
Maputo to Gauteng   0.1074  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.0470 0.8444 61.255  31.1558  -42.4078 
Blantyre to Mocuba   0.000  0.0633  0.0415  0.000  0.1160 0.7781 109.97  32.9646  -72.5606 
Mocuba to Blantyre   0.2298  0.0877 0.6130 0.0675  0.000  0.000 117.70  37.4335 17.66256 
Maputo to Mocuba   0.000  0.0353  0.0000 0.0000  0.000  0.9636 57.481  45.8424  -16.4739 
Mocuba to Maputo   0.000  0.5229  0.0000 0.1501  0.000  0.3269 58.957  38.0174  14.9787 
 
  15Because regime frequencies are defined for each market pair in a direction specific manner 
(generally λk
ji ≠ λk
ij), integration and efficiency also seem to be uniquely defined for specific 
trade directions.  We maintain direction specific descriptions of markets with regards to the 
concept of market integration, since tradability and contestability are also unidirectional 
concepts. However, because equilibrium is an omni-directional concept, we generally need to 
establish for each market pair, a range of frequencies describing the lower and upper bounds for 
efficiency. Thus in the following discussion, efficiency conclusions are drawn by considering 
regime frequencies and trade trends for both trade directions.   
 
Gauteng – Gaborone: This market pair is in perfect integration with a frequency of at least 25% 
observed on the Gauteng to Gaborone trade route.  Trade is bidirectional between these markets, 
continuous on the South Africa to Botswana trade route and discontinuous on the Botswana to 
South Africa route.  Because returns to arbitrage are often negative on the Gaborone to Gauteng 
trade route, the limited trade on route is consistent with efficiency.  Cases of imperfect 
integration also exist, at a fairly high frequency when trade fails to exhaust arbitrage returns 
(observed on the Gauteng to Gaborone trade route), and at a lower frequency when trade occurs 
in spite of negative returns (observed in both trade directions).  The occurrence of regime 4 
(positive returns without trade), as well as with regime 5 (negative returns with trade) in the 
Gaborone to Gauteng trade route appears to indicate that although trade in this direction is 
limited, it is often not consistent with the limited periods in which Gaborone prices exceed 
Gauteng prices, an indication of inefficiency in such market interactions.  
We observe at a national level that the per-unit value of maize exported from Botswana 
to South Africa generally exceeds the market prices prevailing in Gauteng.  Some possible 
  16explanations could be given for these seeming disparities in prices, for example, that some form 
of product differentiation exists that allows Botswana exports to fetch a higher than average 
selling price in South Africa; that maize exports from Botswana are destined to markets other 
than Gauteng, where higher market prices prevail; or that some form of inefficiency exists in the 
markets to sustain these price differences.  We can dismiss the first possibility based on the 
observation that the maize grain under study is a fairly homogenous product.  On the second 
possibility, an assessment of South Africa’s maize producing regions and deficit regions, 
considering proximity of these regions to Botswana, indicates that Gauteng is in fact one of the 
major maize producing regions in the South Africa
6, and we may expected other deficit regions 
such as Northern Cape to offer higher prices for Botswana’s exports.  It is also possible that 
South African consumers pay more for maize sourced from Botswana either due to imperfect 
information on prices prevailing elsewhere in the market (especially possible for consumers 
located in remote parts of the country, close to the Botswana exporting regions), or due to hidden 
costs imbedded in currency conversion
7 and transfer costs.  Note however, that Botswana’s total 
exports of maize to South Africa are rather insignificant, making up a mere 0.5% of the total 
trade volumes between these two markets. 
 
Gauteng – Maputo: This market pair is characterized mostly by imperfect integration with 
positive returns to arbitrage, whereby the flow of maize from Gauteng and neighboring regions 
to Maputo fails to exhaust the arbitrage returns, with limited occurrence of regime 1.  Positive 
                                                 
6 South Africa’s major maize producing region includes parts of Gauteng, North-West, Free State and Mpumalanga.  
7 Possible given that the Botswana Pula is generally stronger than the South African Rand, so that prices quoted in 
Pula may appear lower they actually are when converted to their Rand equivalents.  
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with negative returns imperfect integration also observed at much smaller frequency in either 
trade direction.  At national level, trade is almost continuous on the South Africa to Mozambique 
trade route, with trivial, discontinuous trade in the opposite direction (less than 5% of 
Mozambique’s total exports and an insignificant proportion of South Africa’s total imports).  
Because the trade variable is included as a ‘trade or no-trade’ dummy variable, these trade 
proportions tend to be masked in observed regime frequencies.  
The regular positive returns imperfect integration observed on the Gauteng-Maputo trade 
route is probably explained by the presence of the restrictive 17% VAT on imported maize 
meant for re-sale in grain form, that if incurred, would substantially increases the transfer costs 
for grain traders.  In the opposite trade route, it appears that the very limited trade observed from 
Mozambique to South Africa does constitute some form of inefficiency since, considering 
market prices of maize, the prices prevailing in South Africa relative to Mozambican prices are 
generally not large enough to provide an incentive for this positive flow of maize.  Only when 
per-unit trade values are considered are non-negative returns to trade sometimes expected on this 
trade route.  Thus it appears that Mozambican imports attract an above average price in South 
African markets, for at least parts of the seasons when trade is observed, probably for reasons 
similar to those discussed above for the Botswana case.  Occasionally however, positive trade is 
observed from Mozambique to South Africa that is supported by neither prevailing market prices 
nor per-unit values of traded maize.  
 
Blantyre – Mocuba: For this market pair, perfect integration is observed with a frequency of up 
to 22%, where zero returns to trade are observed on the Mocuba to Blantyre trade route, whereas 
  18regime 2 perfect integration is observed in the opposite direction.  More regularly, positive 
returns imperfect integration is observed in the Mocuba to Blantyre trade direction and 
segmented equilibrium in the Blantyre to Mocuba trade direction.  Market prices in Mocuba are 
consistently lower than Blantyre prices, accounting for the frequently negative returns with 
limited trade on the Blantyre to Mocuba trade route, and the positive returns with higher trade in 
the opposite direction.  Considering that Mocuba lies in Mozambique’s maize surplus region, 
whereas Blantyre lies in the southern, mostly deficit region of Malawi, the observed price and 
trade trends are expected.   
On the Mocuba-Blantyre route, trade generally fails to exhaust arbitrage profits and 
occasionally, positive returns go entirely unexploited (regime 4), possibly due to inadequacy or 
seasonality of maize supply on the Mozambican side.  The limited trade observed in the Blantyre 
to Mocuba direction is also largely inefficient, with negative arbitrage returns, as evidenced by 
the occurrence of regime 5.  Note again though that the proportion of Malawi’s exports to 
Mozambique is rather small, with trade accounting for at most 1.6% of total exports from 
Malawi (and only about 0.1% of Mozambique’s imports).  
 
Maputo – Mocuba: This market pair is used to evaluate the level of integration and efficiency 
between the southern and northern regions of Mozambique.  In terms of geographic location, 
Mocuba is more centrally located than most surplus producing areas of the northern region, so 
that transfer costs are not as restrictive, and limited trade is in fact observed from Mocuba to 
Maputo
8.  Efficiency holds with a high frequency, up to 52% in zero returns to arbitrage, mostly 
without trade, and up to 96% in segmented equilibrium.  Inefficiency is observed in the Mocuba 
to Maputo trade route, where positive returns to arbitrage appear to go unexploited with a 
                                                 
8 A trade frequency of about 2.25% is estimated by Tostão and Brorsen 2005. 
  19frequency of up to 15%.  An assessment of the seasonality trend in arbitrage returns on the 
Mocuba to Maputo trade route indicates that these are highest in the months immediately 
following harvest, when the prices in Mocuba are lowest.  Therefore it does not seem that 
seasonal supply constraints inhibit the flow of maize from the surplus to the deficit region. 
Interesting to note though is the presence of an alternative recipient for the maize surpluses in the 
northern region (Malawi) where, due to market proximity, larger arbitrage returns can be 
realized.  The southern region of Mozambique is thus served by South Africa’s surplus region – 
also more closely located and serviced by an efficient transport system
9.   
 
Discussion of Results 
In concluding this section, some of the reasons for the market segmentation and different forms 
of inefficiency observed in the sample markets are explored.  Imperfect integration with positive 
returns is often a result of either insufficient arbitrage or significant unobservable transfer costs. 
Imperfect integration with negative returns is explained as resulting from temporary disequilibria 
that arise from information and contracting lags, or the existence of significant unobservable 
trade benefits.  In this sample of southern Africa’s maize markets we have market pairs for 
which positive trade is observed even when the observable price differences are negative (for 
example trade from Botswana to South Africa and on occasion, from Malawi to Mozambique). 
In such cases, it appears that trade is a result of inter-country transport bottlenecks that force 
excess producers located close enough to the border to sell across the border for less, if that 
                                                 
9 The distance from Maputo to say Gauteng is less than half the distance to Mocuba, and given the geographic 
location of Maputo, this distance lies almost entirely on the South African side of the border, where more efficient 
transport network systems are in place.  
  20market is more easily accessible. If those producers acquire most of their daily goods and 
services from across the border, near batter trade of maize grain for consumer goods is not 
uncommon.  In such cases, and also considering the differences in currency denominations and 
exchange rate fluctuations, observable price differences could easily become ‘hidden’ to 
smallholder producers and informal traders of maize.  As has already been suggested earlier 
however, returns to arbitrage may appear negative, when in fact the exchange price differs from 
prevailing market prices in either the source or the destination markets.  In an efficient market 
system, we expect that higher import prices would encourage an influx of maize that eventually 
drives the price of imports down to the local levels.  However if the market does not operate 
competitively, for example when the state is a significant player in grain trade, we have cases in 
which the government is willing to pay more for imports than it eventually sells the imported 
commodities for on the local market – a form of subsidy often used in shortage periods to 
support food insecure households.  In a country such as Malawi, where the state is still a 
dominant player in maize importation, such trends are not uncommon
10.   
With regards to unexhausted or unexploited positive returns to arbitrage, it is possible 
that significant unobservable transfer costs exist.  As noted earlier in the description of the 
transfer costs variable, the estimated costs do not account for costs such as insurance, spoilage, 
border inefficiency costs, contracting costs, sanitary and phyto-sanitary compliance costs, 
exchange rate risk, and several other trade-related costs.  Barriers to trade may also be structural, 
so that even when commercial traders are willing to take advantage of higher market prices in a 
neighboring country, government restrictions on grain movement may prevent that from 
happening.  The markets in Malawi certainly have been subject to such regulatory restrictions in 
the past, though reform of such policies has been observed in recent years.  Supply side 
                                                 
10 See also Zant 2005 
  21constraints might also prevent countries from taking advantage of positive arbitrage 
opportunities.  Imperfect information and risk aversion also play a role here, where issues such 
as differences in currency denominations for prices, imperfect information on transfer costs, 
imperfect currency exchange markets, and imperfect information on how to enter foreign 
markets may inhibit trade.  
 
5.    CONCLUSION  
As the SADC region grapples with the recurrent issue of food insecurity, reference is often made 
to increased intra-regional trade as an important integral element of a comprehensive food 
strategy.  The assumption is that as countries reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, they 
become more integrated and more efficient, facilitating commodity movement at lower transfer 
costs, hence lower prices to the final consumer.  With the reform of maize markets in most of the 
region in the past decade, from controlled to market-oriented, we evaluate the extent to which 
these markets have become integrated and efficient, and identify the nature of inefficiency where 
it exists. This paper employs the Barrett-Li model, in collaboration with comprehensive non-
parametric descriptions of market pairs, to provide a holistic assessment of pair-wise market 
interaction.     
Results show that the maize markets in Botswana and South Africa exhibit a fairly high 
level of integration, with limited efficiency; returns to arbitrage are mainly positive on the South 
Africa to Botswana trade route; and markets are linked by bilateral trade, continuous on the 
South Africa to Botswana trade route and discontinuous in the opposite direction.  For South 
Africa and Mozambique, trade is bidirectional and discontinuous, with low frequency of perfect 
integration. Trade between South Africa and Mozambique’s Southern region generally fails to 
  22exhaust arbitrage profits, and though integrated, the market pair appears largely inefficient. 
Malawi and Mozambique’s Northern region exhibit perfect integration of a relatively high 
frequency, although imperfect integration with positive returns appears dominant on the 
Mozambique to Malawi route.  Trade is bidirectional and discontinuous, predominantly in the 
Mozambique to Malawi direction.  
Overall, the southern Africa maize markets considered in the sample seem to exhibit 
significant frequency of market integration, indicating tradability of commodities and 
contestability of markets.  Efficiency holds less frequently, although non-trivially; we observe 
that for those markets characterized by near continuous trade, returns to arbitrage are exhausted 
for about 25% of the time.  Often however, when trade is observed, efficiency appears to be 
weakened by insufficient arbitrage, possibly a result of non-cost barriers to trade (infrastructural 
or regulatory), imperfect information, or supply side constraints.  For these markets, positive 
trade is also occasionally observed when arbitrage returns are negative, possibly due to 
contracting lags, and exchange rate fluctuations.  Where trade is not observed, efficiency appears 
to hold with a slightly higher frequency (up to 52%), so that the lack of trade often is justified by 
the lack of positive arbitrage returns. Significant segmented equilibrium also seems to 
characterize these markets, where again the lack of trade is consistent with expected arbitrage 
returns.  For those markets, efficiency also is occasionally compromised by insufficient 
arbitrage, whereby trade sometime fails to occur even when the returns to arbitrage incentives 
appear favorable (segmented disequilibrium).  Therefore in order of frequency, we observe a 
high frequency of positive returns imperfect integration (regimes 3) and segmented equilibrium 
(regime 6), a fairly regular occurrence of perfect integration (regimes 1 and 2), and irregular 
  23occurrence of segmented disequilibrium (regimes 4) and the negative returns type of imperfect 
integration (regime 5).   
The main limitation of this study is that it makes use of imperfect transfer costs data, 
extrapolated from isolated point estimates, obtained from various sources for different time 
periods. Such inconsistencies increase measurement error, and compromise the accuracy of 
parameter estimates.  More work is required to accurately measure these variables, and monitor 
trade between specific markets in the region.  In addition, the analysis suffers most of the 
limitations of parity bounds models identified in section 4.3, such as susceptibility of parameter 
estimates to choice of probability distribution functions, and the static nature of the analyses.  
Similar studies handle the former through Monte Carlo sensitivity analyses, to evaluate 
robustness of the chosen distributional forms (Barrett and Li 2001, Barrett et al 2000, Baulch 
1997).  Similar robustness test for this study would provide additional information on the validity 
of test results.  
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